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Abstract 
This study aims to establish a typology of Tunisian listed firms according to their corporate governance 
characteristics and disclosure quality. The paper uses disclosed scores to examine corporate governance practices 
of Tunisian listed firms. A content analysis of 46 Tunisian listed firms from 2001 to 2010 has been carried out and 
a disclosure index developed to determine the level of disclosure of the companies. The disclosure quality is 
appreciated through the quantity and also through the nature (type) of information disclosed. Applying the decision 
tree method, the obtained Tree diagrams provide ways to know the characteristics of a particular firm regardless of 
its level of disclosure. Obtained results show that the characteristics of corporate governance to achieve good 
quality of disclosure are not unique for all firms. These structures are not necessarily all of the recommendations of 
best practices, but converge towards the best combination. Indeed, in practice, there are companies which have a 
good quality of disclosure but are not well governed. However, we hope that by improving their governance system 
their level of disclosure may be better. These findings show, in a general way, a convergence towards the standards 
of corporate governance with a few exceptions related to the specificity of Tunisian listed firms and show the need 
for the adoption of a code for each context. These findings shed the light on corporate governance features that 
enhance incentives for good disclosure. It allows identifying, for each firm and in any date, corporate governance 
determinants of disclosure quality. More specifially, and all being equal,obtained tree makes a rule of decision for 
the company to know the level of disclosure based on certain characteristics of the governance strategy adopted by 
the latter.   
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1.INTRODUCTION 
 
The financial scandals have 
drawn the attention of regulators and 
policymakers, especially in the 
developing markets (S&P, 2008; Mulili 
and Wong, 2011; Feleaga, N. and al., 
2011; Shanikat and Abbadi, 2011 and 
Erkens and Hung, 2012). Disclosure and 
transparency are considered as an 
important component and one of the 
main indicators of an effective corporate 
governance structure. Indeed, according 
to Mangena & Tauringana (2007) the 
issue of corporate governance was long 
ignored in developing countries. Also, 
many studies tried to examine the effect 
of one or several corporate governance 
mechanisms on disclosure quality (Ho 
and Wong, 2001; Chau and Gray, 2002; 
Bushee and Noe, 2001; Chen and 
Jaggi’s, 2000 and Wong, 2001). This 
paper aims to contribute to the literature 
on corporate governance by providing 
taxonomy of Tunisian listed firms 
according to corporate governance 
characteristics and disclosure quality 
using a new approach based on the 
Decision Tree Method. In other words, 
we try to explain differences in 
disclosure quality of Tunisian Listed 
Firms using various attributes of 
corporate governance. The disclosure 
quality is appreciated through the 
quantity and also through the nature 
(type) of information disclosed. 
Corporate governance attributes used in 
this study consists of ownership 
structure, board of directors and audit 
committees. Indeed, it is to show that the 
quality of disclosure is related to a 
corporate governance structure specific 
to each type of firm. To do this, we will 
start by constructing an index of 
disclosure, for each category of 
information disclosed, which translated 
for each company, the scope of the 
quality of disclosure from a target 
company that discloses all information. 
In other words, we will explain the 
results based on the importance of the 
information disclosed on the market. 
Indeed, financial, forecasting or non-
financial information certainly has a 
larger value for investors than a general 
or relating to executive information. 
Thus, we will consolidate the 
information disclosed in two types: 
important information (combining 
Financial, forecasting and non financial 
information), which can reflect the 
health and the situation of the company 
in question and information of average 
importance (it means general or relating 
to the management and shareholders 
information). In other words, we 
interpret the scope of the quality of 
disclosure for a company based on the 
degree of importance of the information 
disclosed. Specifically, we will identify 
characteristics of governance to improve 
the quality of disclosure for each type of 
information, but we will concentrate 
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mainly on the information of high 
importance. Thus, we try to verify the 
existence of a convergence between the 
recommendations on corporate 
governance and the quality of disclosure. 
So, following this logic, a company that 
has a good system of governance, and 
which adopts recommendations for 
governance has to disclose Financial, 
forecast and non financial information 
(i.e. of high importance). Then, we use a 
decision tree model to analyze the 
profile of groups of companies in terms 
of corporate governance. In other words, 
we will try to build a decision tree to 
understand the characteristics of a 
particular firm regardless of its level of 
disclosure. More specifically, and all 
being equal, we will try to establish a 
decision rule, which allows to any firm 
to know its level of disclosure using 
corporate governance strategy adopted 
by the latter.   
The reminder of this paper is 
organized as follows. The second section 
presents the information disclosure in 
the Tunisian context. Section three 
provides a description of the sample, 
variables measurement and empirical 
model and results. Section four presents 
results. The last section is reserved to the 
conclusion. 
 
2.INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN 
THE TUNISIAN CONTEXT 
Transparency and disclosure 
have gained increased importance by 
many researchers, which attribute the 
problem to great weakness in corporate 
governance and this was considered a 
contributing factor to broader systematic 
problems in emerging markets (standard 
& Poor’s, 2008). Previous research has 
been made mainly in the USA where 
investors are relatively highly protected. 
Tunisian context is worth to study 
because it presents much specificity. 
The aim of this paper is to 
identify the correspondence between the 
quality of disclosure and characteristics 
of corporate governance of Tunisian 
listed firms, in order to establish 
taxonomy of Tunisian listed firms 
according to their disclosure quality 
level and corporate governance features. 
In the Tunisian context several 
laws define and regulate the mandatory 
information, in order to provide to all 
investors transparency and an equal level 
of information. These regulations are 
listed in several legal sources which are: 
- The companies accounting system;  
- The commercial companies’ code; 
- Act No. 1994 - 117 of November 
14th, 1994; 
- Order of Chartered Accountants of 
Tunis; 
- Law n ° 2005-96 of October 18th, 
2005. 
 
The Accounting System :the 
accounting system defined the set of 
principles and rules used to the 
establishment and presentation of the 
accounting documents. It aims to reduce 
the uncertainty of its users as well 
regarding the knowledge of the past than 
predicting the future. According to the 
accounting Act, each company must 
prepare and submit financial statements 
no later than three months following the 
closing date of the fiscal year. The 
financial statements are formed by a 
whole structure whose elements 
(balance, the result State, the State of 
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cash flows and the notes to the financial 
statements) are inter-related. 
 
The Commercial Companies’ 
Code: It includes a set of laws and 
obligations, to comply with financial 
information. Indeed, according to article 
128 of the code of commercial 
companies (CCC), the Annual Ordinary 
General Assembly must be held within 
three months from the closing of 
exercise and twenty days at least before 
the General Assembly which is the 
approval management accounts. In 
addition, under article 201 of the CCC 
Board of Directors must establish, at the 
close of each fiscal year, under his 
responsibility the financial statements of 
the company in accordance with the 
accounting system of the companies act. 
Act No. 1994 - 117 of November 
14th, 1994 Relating To The 
Reorganization Of The Financial 
Market, It presents in the title I the 
different procedures for information and 
publications required by the regulations 
in force in the Tunisian Stock Market. 
Indeed, according to this law, each 
undertaking using public savings has to 
put at the disposal of the Board of the 
Financial Market (BFM) and the Stock 
Exchange Securities of Tunis (SEST) a 
number of documents no later than 4 
business days after the holding of the 
general meeting. In addition, it must 
publish a prospectus for the information 
of the public and its conditions of 
preparations. Moreover, companies 
admitted to the side of the stock 
exchange are required to provide to the 
BFM and the SEST an interim States 
established under the responsibility of 
the Board of Directors no later than one 
month after the end of each semester ran 
from the exercise. 
The order of accounting experts 
in Tunisia sets the statements as being 
"accounting documents established, in 
principle, each year and usually are the 
subject of communication to three parts 
(shareholders, bankers and tax 
administrators). 
 
Law no 2005-96 of October 18th, 
2005 on strengthening the security of 
financial relations includes provisions 
for strengthening the transparency of 
financial transactions, in compliance 
with the rules of financial disclosure for 
all forms of companies and given their 
size, their commitments and their 
activities. The distinction between the 
obligations borne by corporations for 
securing the information they disclose is 
no longer, now linked to the public call 
for savings only. This fundamental 
change is based essentially on the 
principle that financial transparency is a 
vital condition in transactions and an 
overarching principle between the 
company and its environment with all its 
components including shareholders, 
lenders, clients, suppliers and the 
listeners. 
 
3.MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
The main goal of our approach 
was to provide taxonomy of Tunisian 
listed firms basing on the relation 
between corporate governance features 
and disclosure quality . 
 
3.1.Sample Selection 
Data were collected on 
companies listed on the Tunisian stock 
exchange, using content analysis; the 
sample consisted of 46 Tunisian listed 
firms from 2001 to 2010. 
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3.2.Measurement of Corporate 
Governance Variables 
Corporate governance is approached by 
a set of variables related to the 
ownership structure, board of directors 
and audit committees. The Table 1 
below summarizes definition and 
measurement of the different variables 
of corporate governance used in this 
study: 
Table I – Definitions and 
Measurements of corporate 
governance variables 
 
Owner 
ship 
structure 
FAM 
Family 
ownership : percentage of 
ownership held by family 
CON 
CP 
Ownership Conce
ntration : percentage of 
ownership held by majority 
shareholders (more  than 
5%) 
ETA 
PR 
State Ownership: 
percentage of ownership 
held by the State 
INST 
PR 
Institutional 
ownership : percentage of 
ownership held by 
institutional 
ADM 
PR 
Directors 
ownership : percentage of 
ownership held by directors 
PM 
DG 
Manageial 
ownership : percentage of 
ownership held by 
managers 
Audit 
commit 
ee 
CA 
DT 
Existence of an 
audit committee : A binary 
variable equal to 1 if the 
there is an audit committee 
and 0 if not  
BIG4 
A binary variable 
equal to 1 if the audit 
committee is a Big4 one 
and 0 if not 
 
3.3.Disclosure Index Construction 
The study uses 42 attributes or 
items in all to measure extent of 
disclosure in Tunisia. This attributes 
have been compiled by Botosan 
(1997).and used by many previous 
studies on disclosure. Using an objective 
methodology, annual reports are 
analyzed for common disclosure items 
grouped into five sub-categories (S-C):
Variables 
Variables 
Definitions and 
Measurements 
Board of 
directors 
TAILCO 
The board size: 
number of directors 
in the board 
ADMEXT 
The Percentage of 
outsiders in the 
board: number of 
outsiders/ total 
number of directors 
in the board 
DUAL 
Duality:A binary 
variable equal to 1 if 
the manager is 
member in the board 
and 0 if not. 
MANDAD 
Director mandatory: 
number of years as a 
member of the board 
of directors 
MANDMA 
Manager 
mandatory: number 
of years as a 
member of the board 
of directors. 
ROPDG 
CEO turnover A 
binary variable 
equal to 1 if the 
manager is was 
replaced and 0 if 
not. 
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S-C1 - General information on 
the company; 
S-C 2 - Information on the 
direction and shareholders;  
S-C 3 - Non Financial 
information; 
S-C 4 - Forecasting information; 
S-C 5 - Financial Information. 
The Table 2 gives an example of 
items relative to the first sub-category, 
Items relative to the General information 
on the company: 
Table II – Example of items relative to 
the Sub-category 1 of the Evaluation 
Grid 
I
items 
S-C 
(1) : Gen
eral 
Informat
ion on 
the 
company 
S
it
u
at
io
n
 
E
vo
lu
ti
on
 
C
om
m
en
ts
 
   
   
 G
ra
p
hi
cs
 
I
item1 
Historic 
and 
presentati
on of the 
company 
(legal 
form, 
capital, 
creation 
date, 
organizat
ion 
chart,…) 
    
I 
 
i
 
 
 
    
item2 Presentati
on of the 
company 
objective
s 
item3 
Presentati
on of the 
general 
strategy 
of the 
company 
   
 
 
 
NO 
item4 
Presentati
on of the 
economic 
environm
ent of the 
company 
sector 
and its 
impact 
    
item5 
Actions 
taken by 
the 
company 
to 
achieve 
its 
objective
s 
   NO 
item6 
Descripti
on of  the 
main 
features 
associate
d with 
the  
company 
market 
   NO 
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item7 
Data on 
company 
info. sys. 
  
 NO  NO 
 
criteria (situation, graphics, comments 
and variation), the use of Non Linear 
Principle Components Analysis 
(NLPCA) is an important step, which 
allows to identify, for each item, a 
combination of factors built on the basis 
of correlations between the different 
criteria of each item.
 
- Situation : that is to say, presenting basic 
information without any details (amount, 
values). 
- Comments : presentation of information, 
explanation and analysis by 
management. 
- Graphics : in cases where the item would be 
presented as a histogram or other graph. 
- Evolution : presentation of the evolution of the 
item on a period > or = 3 years. 
For each sub-category and for 
each company, a disclosure score is 
developed from a binary evaluation of 
the number of items present in their 
annual reports: if a company discloses a 
particular attribute, a score of 1 is 
awarded and if not a score of 0 is 
awarded. A similar approach has been 
adopted by previous studies on 
disclosure and corporate governance 
such as Pateonel and al., (2002) and 
Tsamenyi and al. (2007).  
The second step consists on 
locating the position of each company 
relative to a target one (a company 
which is considered as a 
reference).Thus, we proceed by insertion 
of an additional observation: a fictitious 
company (for reference) that discloses 
all information and which will be used 
as a reference for the companies of the 
sample. Indeed, as shown in table 2, 
each item is evaluated according to four  
 
The application of the NLPCA to 
the different items of each sub-category 
allows identifying, for each company 
(the companies of the sample and the 
reference company) its co-ordinates 
from the different axes identified for 
each item as below: 
































k
2
k
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
i
x
x
.
..
.
.
.
x
x
x
x
f
  
































k
2
k
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
R
y
y
.
..
.
.
.
y
y
y
y
f
 
 
 
Where; 
k is the number of items of the 
evaluation grid 
fi represents coordinates of the 
company i on different axes, i = 1,..., 46; 
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fR represents coordinates of the 
reference company on the various axes.  
k
1x and 
k
2x represent 
coordinates of each firm relating to the 
item k, k = 1,…..,42; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
k
1y et 
k
2y  represent coordinates of the 
reference company relating to the item k.
 
 
The Table 3 below presents 
results of the NLPCA applied to the first 
three items of the first sub-category: 
 
Table III – Results of the NLPCA 
applied to the first sub category 
I
items 
S-C (1) : General 
Information on the 
company 
axes 
 
X
1 
X
2 
I
item1 
Historic and 
presentation of the 
company (situation) 
 
0
.641 
Historic and 
presentation of the 
company 
(evolution) 
0
.776 
 
Historic and 
presentation of the 
company 
(comments) 
0
.449 
 
Historic and 
presentation of the 
company (graphic) 
 
0
.658 
Proper values 
1
.864 
1
.106 
% of the variances 
explained by the factor 
4
6.597 
2
7.644 
Total variance 74.242 
I
item2 
Presentation of the 
company objectives 
(situation) 
0
.774 
 
Presentation of the 
company objectives 
(evolution) 
 
0
.673 
Presentation of the 
company objectives 
(comments) 
0
.769 
 
Presentation of the 
company objectives 
(graphic) 
 
0
.699 
Proper values 
1
.692 
1
.338 
% of variances 
explained by the factor 
4
2.294 
3
3.459 
Total variance 75.753 
I
item3 
Presentation of the 
general strategy of 
the company 
(situation) 
0
.924 
 
Presentation of the 
general strategy of 
the company 
(evolution) 
 
0
.992 
Presentation of the 
general strategy of 
the company 
(comments) 
0
.918 
 
Proper values 
1
.713 
0
.997 
% of variances 
explained by the factor 
5
7.087 
3
3.221 
Total variance 90.308 
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The next step consists on 
computing a disclosure index for each 
sub-category of the grid. So, for each 
sub-category, the extent of the disclosure 
of the firm i is measured by the 
Euclidean, distance which is the root of 
the sum of the squares of the differences 
of the coordinates of the firm in question 
and the firm of reference. Indeed, the 
objective here is to describe the 
proximities between the sample 
companies and the reference company, 
which discloses all information and 
which is considered as a referential for 
disclosure: more the distance that 
separates the company i of the company 
of reference is high and more the 
company is qualified as a company 
which has a bad policy of disclosure 
policy. The formula for calculating these 
distances is then as follows: 
2/17
1
2
22
2
11 ])()([),(tan 


k
kkkk
Ri xyxyffcejdis
 
Where j is the number of distance 
calculated; j = 1, 2,...5 
This work has allowed to 
calculate, for each company, five 
distances or indexes measuring the 
extent of the disclosure quality:  
 An index that reflects the quality 
of disclosure on general 
information noted Index1; 
 An index that reflects the quality 
of disclosure information about 
direction and shareholders noted 
Index2;  
 An index that reflects the quality 
of disclosure about non financial 
information noted Index3;  
 An index that reflects the quality 
of disclosure about forecast 
information noted Index4; 
 An index which reflects the quality 
of disclosure about financial 
information noted 
 
 
 Index5;  
Results of indexes computation 
are given by the table 4 below: 
 
Table IV - Distribution of disclosure 
indexes 
 
Index 
1 
Index 
2 
Index 
3 
Index 
4 
Index 
5 
Minimum 3.35 3.9 5.7 5.68 3.07 
Maximum 4.43 4.71 6.6 3.67 4.28 
Mean 4.07 4.21 6.28 3.20 3.81 
Standard 
deviation 
0.23 0.21 0.19 0.26 0.28 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
In this part, we’ll try to establish 
connections between scores of 
information disclosure and governance 
characteristics of Tunisian listed firms. 
In other words, the object is to divide 
firms of the sample into subgroups 
according to values of the variables of 
governance which, at each stage, 
discriminates the best variable to model, 
  
Dr. Wided Khiari 
P a g e  | 54| Emerging Markets Journal  
Volume 3 No 2 (2013)   |   ISSN 2158-8708 (online)   |   10.5195/emaj.2013.33 |   http://emaj.pitt.edu 
i.e. the quality of disclosure. To do this, 
we will use a decision tree model to 
analyze the profile of groups of 
companies in terms of corporate 
governance characteristics, allowing to 
improve the disclosure quality. 
In this step, for each type of 
information disclosed, we started by 
dividing the companies of the sample 
based on the distribution of scores of 
disclosure obtained. This operation 
conduct to three classes reflecting the 
extent of the disclosure quality (good, 
average, bad). The class characterized by 
a high quality of disclosure is composed 
by companies with the lowest scores (i.e. 
less than 33rd percentile). The class 
characterized by a an average quality of 
disclosure is composed by firms with 
scores between the 33rd percentile and 
the 66th percentile. Class characterized 
by poor quality of disclosure is 
composed by companies with the highest 
scores (i.e. higher than 66th percentile). 
The classification of firms following 
scores of information disclosure led 
therefore to a structure formed of three 
classes for all types of disclosed 
information except for non-financial 
information. For this type of information 
we have considered two classes: the 
class composed by firms with scores 
lower than the median is considered as 
the class of good disclosure quality. 
However, the class of the firms with 
scores higher than the median is 
considered as the class of poor 
disclosure quality (see Figure 1)  
 
 
Figure I. Distribution of the firms 
of the sample according to the 
disclosure scores 
 
 
The next step consists to build a 
decision tree for each type of 
information disclosed to identify the 
characteristics of corporate governance 
leading to the good quality of disclosure.  
 
 
Having constructed the decision 
trees, we will extract, from each tree, the 
leaves with the highest percentage of 
observations with the quality of 
disclosure as shown in figures 2, 3, 4, 5 
and 6. Then, for every sheet we will 
determine its corporate governance 
characteristics. 
4.1.Decision Trees: disclosure 
quality explained by corporate 
governance features 
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The decisions trees obtained show 
that the sector variable is the best 
independent variable of the quality of 
disclosure for all types of disclosed 
information:  
Figure III – Decision Tree : 
Information on the direction and 
shareholders 
For the companies of the financial 
sector, the variable that allows better 
discrimination for the general 
information and on management and 
shareholders is the existence or not of an 
audit committee in the companies (see 
figures 2 and 3).  
 
Figure II – Decision tree: General 
Information on the company 
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If companies have an audit 
committee, the ownership concentration 
is the following independent variable. 
Where this percentage is low, the model 
includes a different additional 
independent variable for each type of 
information: the percentage held by 
families for information on management 
and shareholders and the percentage held 
by administrators for the general 
information. However, if this percentage 
is high, the duality is the discrimination 
variable for the quality of disclosure of 
information on the direction. However, 
for firms belonging to the non-financial 
sector, independent variables are 
completely different. For general 
information, the best variable is the 
percentage held by institutional. For 
companies where the presence of 
institutional is not significant, the 
variable that provides the best 
discrimination is the size of the Board of 
Directors. Similarly, if the size is not 
important, the percentage held by 
families remains the best following 
independent variable. For information 
relative to the board of directors, the best 
variable is the State ownership. if this 
part is high, the family ownership is the 
following independent variable, 
followed by the existence of a big 4 
audit committee in the firm.  
For companies of the financial 
sector, the concentration of ownership is 
the independent variable which allows 
better discrimination on financial and 
non-financial information (see figures 
4 and 6) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure IV – Decision Tree: Non 
Financial Information
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Figure VI – Decision Tree: Financial  
Information
 
 
Where this percentage is high, 
another independent variable will be 
included: the institutional property. 
Finally, if the latter is low, the following 
variable is the property of 
administrators. However, for the non-
financial sector companies, the variables 
of discrimination are totally different. 
Indeed, for the non-financial 
information, the most important variable 
is the percentage of outside directors in 
the Board of Directors, followed by the 
share held by the families. For financial 
information, the best independent 
variables are the percentage held by 
families and the concentration of 
ownership. If the latter is high, the 
model includes an additional variable 
which is the size of the Council. Where 
the size is small, the following variable 
is the use of one of the large audit firms.  
 
The last type is the forecast 
information. Corporate Governance 
variables that explain the good quality of 
disclosure of such information are totally 
different (see figure 5). 
 
Figure V – Decision Tree: Forecasting 
information 
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Indeed, for companies of the 
financial sector, the best variable which 
allows better discrimination is the 
percentage of outsiders in the board of 
directors followed by the size of the 
Board of Directors. However, for 
companies belonging to the non-
financial sector, the best independent 
variable is the size of the board followed 
by concentration of ownership. If the 
latter is high, the managerial ownership 
is the following variable; otherwise it is 
the percentage of outsiders in the board 
of directors. Finally, if the managerial 
ownership is low the pattern includes 
another variable that is the percentage of 
outside directors in the Council. 
4.2.Taxonomy of Tunisian 
listed firms 
 
As shown above Structures provided by 
the decision trees provide ways to build 
groups to identify optimal combinations 
of characteristics of corporate 
governance to achieve good quality of 
disclosure. Indeed, the use of this 
method is justified by the fact that firms 
differ, and each company has its 
specificities. Thus, we cannot talk about 
an optimal corporate governance 
structure for all firms and even for those 
belonging to the same activity sector.  
In what follows, we will try to make 
sense of the different results depending 
on the type of information disclosed. 
Indeed, we were able to get 23 groups 
where the contribution of corporate 
governance characteristics in the 
improvement of the quality of disclosure 
differs. Distribution and combinations of 
the corporate governance characteristics 
of each group are given by the Table 5. 
 
Table V - Taxonomy of Tunisian Listed Firms 
according to the corporate governance 
features and disclosure quality 
Nature of 
the 
information 
disclosed 
Groups 
Corporate 
governance 
features 
S-C 1 – Good 
disclosure 
quality of 
General 
information on 
the company 
Group 1 
Financial 
sector, no 
audit 
committee, 
low ownership 
concentration. 
Group 2 
Financial 
sector, 
existence of 
an audit 
committee, 
high 
ownership 
concentration 
Group 3 
Financial 
sector, 
existence of 
an audit 
committee, 
low ownership 
concentration, 
low directors 
ownership. 
Group 4 
Non financial 
sector, low 
institutional 
ownership, 
big size of 
board of 
directors 
 
 
 
Group 5 
 
 
 
Non financial 
sector, low 
institutional 
ownership, 
small size of 
board of 
directors, 
average 
family 
property 
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Group 6 
Non financial 
sector, high 
institutional 
property. 
S-C 2 – Good 
disclosure 
quality of 
Information 
on the 
direction and 
shareholders 
Group 1 
Financial 
sector, no 
audit 
committee, 
audit 
committee 
belong to a 
big4 
Group 2 
Financial 
sector, 
existence of 
an audit 
committee, 
low ownership 
concentration, 
high family 
property. 
Group 3 
Financial 
sector, 
existence of 
an audit 
committee, 
high 
ownership 
concentration, 
duality. 
Group 4 
Non financial 
sector, high 
state 
property, high 
family 
property, high 
institutional 
property, 
audit 
committee is 
not a big4 
Group 5 
Non financial 
sector, high 
state 
property, low 
family  
property. 
S-C 3 – Good 
disclosure 
quality of Non 
Financial 
Group1 
Financial 
sector, low 
ownership 
concentration. 
information 
 
 
Group 2 
 
 
Financial 
sector, high 
concentration, 
low 
institutional 
property, low 
property of 
directors. 
Group 3 
Financial 
sector, high 
concentration, 
high 
institutional 
property 
Group 4 
Non financial 
sector, low 
percentage of 
outsiders in 
the board, 
high family 
property, 
Group 5 
Non financial 
sector, an 
average 
percentage of 
outsiders in 
the  board, 
low family 
property 
S-C 4 – Good 
disclosure 
quality of 
Forecasting 
information 
Group 1 
Financial 
sector, high 
percentage of 
outsiders in 
the board, 
small size of 
the board. 
 
 
Group 2 
 
 
 
Non financial 
sector, big 
size of the 
board, high 
concentration, 
low 
managerial 
property, low 
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percentage of 
outsiders in 
the board. 
Group 3 
Non financial 
sector, big 
size of the 
board, high 
ownership 
concentration, 
high 
managerial 
property. 
Group 4 
Non financial 
sector, big 
size of the 
board, low 
ownership 
concentration, 
low 
percentage of 
outsiders in 
the board. 
S-C 5 – Good 
disclosure 
quality of 
Financial 
Information 
Group 1 
Financial 
sector, low 
concentration 
Group 2 
Non financial 
sector, low 
family 
property, high 
concentration, 
small size of 
the board, 
audit 
committee is 
a big4. 
Group 3 
Non financial 
sector, low 
family 
property, high 
concentration. 
 
 
S C 1 - General Information. 
Groups 1, 2 and 3 include companies of 
the financial sector. G1 is the group with 
a low ownership concentration but with 
no audit committee. This result is 
explained by the fact that in firms with 
dispersed ownership interest conflicts 
are more important than in firms with 
concentrated ownership. In addition, 
these companies have no way of internal 
control, to reduce these conflicts and to 
ensure that their interests are optimized, 
some shareholders require leaders to 
disclose more information. Therefore, 
the disclosure of information is likely to 
be more intensive in this type of firms. 
Indeed, disclosure can go up to present 
the information of medium importance 
to investors. G2 and G3 are 
characterized by the existence of an 
audit committee but different levels of 
concentration. For the Group 3 with a  
low concentration of ownership, to the 
share held by administrators has not to 
be important. 
In fact, where the ownership is 
concentrated, the quality of disclosure is 
more complicated. Conflicts of interest 
are no longer between managers and 
shareholders but between the majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders 
(Ho and Wong, 2001). In such 
situations, leaders are encouraged to 
behave against the interests of the 
minority in retaining information on the 
firm. Similarly, Archambault and 
Archambault (2003) have advanced that 
investors are regarded as the main 
beneficiaries of the strategy of 
information disclosure. However, 
investors who hold a high percentage of 
the shares that constitute the capital of 
the company have the advantage of 
information directly from the company. 
Therefore the need for disclosure may 
decrease, where the existence of a 
Committee at the breast of this type of 
firms remains necessary to resolve such 
problems. The characteristics of Group 2 
show that in companies with a strong 
concentration of ownership, an audit 
committee allows to achieve a good 
quality of information disclosure. 
However, since major carriers get the 
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information directly from the company, 
the type of information disclosed is not 
of considerable importance. Group 3 is 
distinguished from other groups by an 
additional characteristic which is a small 
proportion owned by administrators. In 
fact, due to the concentration of property 
conflicts can be resolved by the 
existence of an audit committee, but if 
administrators property is high, the latter 
being closest to the company, can reduce 
the information disclosed to investors, so 
for this group administrators ownership 
is low. 
Groups 4, 5 and 6 is composed 
by firms belonging to the non-financial 
sector. G6 is characterized by a high 
institutional property. This result can be 
explained by the fact that the 
institutional have become key players in 
governance structures, they may 
therefore compel the leaders to perform 
frequent disclosures. (Elgazzar, 1998 
and Bushe and Noah, 2001). Also, 
institutional investors are considered as 
the most demanding of a regular and 
timely published financial information. 
However, where this share is low (G4 
and G5), other characteristics of 
governance are involved. G4 is 
characterized by a large size of the 
Board of Directors.  
This is explained by the fact that 
the presence of administrators in the 
Council is likely to control the actions of 
the leaders in the institutional property is 
low, and encourage him to disclose 
more. In fact, some authors assume that 
the size is small increase more chances 
of manipulation on the part of the 
leaders, however a large Council may 
have more expertise and managerial 
opportunism. However, a Council of 
small size can be effective in cases 
where a part of the property of the 
company is owned by families. These 
are generally reluctant in their 
communication of information and 
consider the company as a family 
business, where outsiders have no right 
to access to information. In this case, 
over the Board of Directors is of reduced 
size more effective will be the control of 
managerial expediency and thus 
companies will be more encouraged to 
announce more information (Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000 and Mak and Li, 2001) (see 
figure 7) 
 
Figure VII – Firms Taxonomy 
According to Governance and Good 
Disclosure Quality of General 
Information on The Company 
 
 
 
S C 2 - Information on The 
Direction And Shareholders. Groups 1, 
2 and 3 includes financial firms. G1 is 
the group composed by firms that does 
not have internal audit committee, and 
so to limit the opportunistic behavior of 
their managers, companies in this group 
tend to have a big 4 external audit 
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committee. They are more likely to 
encourage leaders to disclose as much 
information to protect their reputation. 
G2 and G3 are characterized by the 
existence of an audit committee. 
However, G2 has a low concentration 
and incorporates another governance 
characteristic that is a significant 
presence of families. Such situation is 
characterized by a significant presence 
of families led to a reluctance to disclose 
information outsiders. Thus, the 
existence of a committee within the 
company and a low concentration of 
ownership may be a good way of 
reducing information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders, 
especially because the information 
disclosed has not a considerable 
importance for investors. G3 is 
characterized by a high concentration of 
ownership and combine the functions of 
management and control. Because the 
information is not of high importance in 
a situation where both roles of CEO and 
Chairman of directors Board may harm 
the independence of the board and 
increase conflicts of agency within the 
business and therefore the quality of the 
information disclosed is no longer 
credible (Gul and Leung, 2004) and 
where the high concentration of 
ownership is likely to create conflicts 
between majority and minority 
shareholders, the existence of an audit 
committee can be a good incentive to 
disclose information about the 
management and shareholders. 
 
Groups 4 and 5 include non-
financial companies. G4 is characterized 
by a high family ownership which is 
likely to limit the information disclosed. 
However, this problem is solved by the 
intervention of the State and institutional 
who hold a significant part of the 
property and the use of large firms audit. 
In addition, companies that form the 
group 5 have a small family-owned and 
high state-owned, which is already 
justified by previous studies (see 
figure8) 
 
 
 
Figure VIII – Firms Taxonomy 
According to Governance and Good 
Disclosure Quality of Information on 
the Direction and Shareholders 
  
 
 
 
S C 3-Non Financial 
Information. Firms of groups 1, 2 and 3 
belong to the financial sector. G1 has a 
single characteristic of governance 
which is likely to improve the quality of 
disclosure of non-financial information: 
a low concentration of ownership, which 
is justified by the literature. The two 
groups 2 and 3 are characterized by a a 
high concentration of ownership. 
Problems of interest between majority 
and minority shareholders related to this 
concentration are accompanied in group 
3 with a strong institutional presence 
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which is likely to enhance the disclosure 
of non-financial information. Group 4 
differs from Group 3 by a low 
institutional and administrators. In 
groups 4 and 5 we find are the non-
financial firms. The attributes of these 
two groups are similar, but the level of 
family ownership and the number of 
outside directors in the board are 
different. Group 4 is characterized by a 
low number of outside directors, but a 
high family ownership, while Group 5 is 
composed of firms whose board is 
formed by a percentage of external 
medium and low family ownership (see 
figure 9). 
  
 
 
 
S C 4 - Forecasting Information. 
Group 1 is formed by companies in the 
financial sector. Characteristics of 
corporate governance tend to improve 
the quality of disclosure looking for this 
type of business are related only to the 
composition of the board of 
administration. In fact, this group is 
characterized by a small board 
dominated by outside. This result was 
suggested by Jensen (1993), who stated 
that a board filled effectively its 
supervisory board is composed mainly 
by small external directors. According to 
the agency theory in the presence of 
external counseling helps reduce agency 
problems, and subsequently, the 
information asymmetries due to their 
independence and objectivity. 
 
 
Figure IX – Firms Taxonomy 
According to Governance and Good  
Disclosure Quality of Non Financial 
Information  
 
 
 
 
 
Groups 2 and 3 have the same 
attributes for membership industry, 
board size and the degree of 
concentration of ownership. In fact, they 
are formed by the non-financial sector 
businesses with highly concentrated 
ownership and whose board of directors 
is composed of a large number of 
administrators. However, they differ in 
the percentage held by the manager. G3 
is the group with high managerial 
ownership. This result can be explained 
by the fact that managerial ownership 
reduces agency problems and managerial 
opportunism arising from the separation 
of ownership and control. Therefore, 
owner-managers will no longer retain 
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information and can improve the quality 
of disclosure. G2 is characterized by a 
low percentage of outside directors. This 
deficiency is corrected by a low 
managerial ownership. According to 
Gelb (2000) companies whose leaders 
hold a small proportion of capital better 
meet the informational needs of 
investors and those whose participation 
is important. In fact, when leaders do 
have a small percentage of equity, the 
increase in value due to good 
communication is the risk of loss of 
human capital tied to their employment 
and various benefits attached thereto. 
 
The group is composed of four 
companies belonging to the non-
financial sector, with a large board 
formed by a small number of outside 
directors. However, this group is 
characterized by a low concentration of 
ownership that is likely to improve the 
quality of disclosure (see figure 10). 
 
 Figure X – Firms Taxonomy 
According to Governance and Good 
Disclosure Quality of The Forecasting 
Information  
 
 
S C 5 - Financial Information. 
Group 1 consists of firms in the financial 
sector with a low concentration of 
ownership. This group has the same 
characteristics as the first group of 
companies with a good quality of 
disclosure of non-financial information. 
This result is partly explained in the 
literature that firms with a low 
concentration tend to have a more 
extensive disclosure. On the other hand, 
it shows that firms in the financial sector 
with a low concentration tend to insist 
on disclosure of non-financial and 
financial. Groups 2 and 3 is that non-
financial firms characterized by low 
family ownership and a high 
concentration of ownership. However, 
they are distinguished by the size of the 
board. For companies where the board 
has a reduced size, the use of a large 
audit firms is an important feature in 
improving the quality of disclosure of 
financial nature (see figure 11). 
 
Figure XI – Firms Taxonomy 
According to Governance and Good 
Disclosure Quality of The Financial 
Information 
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5.CONCLUSION 
This study aims to use correspondence 
between corporate governance 
characteristics and disclosure quality in 
order to establish taxonomy of Tunisian 
listed firms using a new approach based 
on the Decision Tree Method, and to 
show that good quality of disclosure is 
related to a governance structure specific 
to each firm. To do this, we started by 
constructing an index allowing to assess 
the extent of the quality of disclosure in 
annual reports for Tunisian listed firms. 
Indeed, the disclosure quality is 
appreciated through the quantity and 
also through the nature (type) of 
information disclosed. This idea is 
explained by the fact that an overall 
score of disclosure may not reflect the 
actual strategy of disclosure of the 
company in question. A firm may have a 
good score of disclosure but the 
disclosed information is not important 
for investors. This work has enabled us 
to calculate, for each company, five 
indexes measuring the extent of the 
quality of disclosure by type of 
information disclosed  
In the next step, we tried to relate 
scores of information disclosure to 
corporate governance characteristics of 
Tunisian listed firms. Tree diagrams 
obtained provide the means to know the 
characteristics of a particular firm 
regardless of its level of disclosure. They 
enable to identify corporate governance 
factors of its quality of disclosure for 
any types of information for each 
company, and in any date. More 
specifically and everything being equal, 
this tree makes a decision rule that 
allows the company to know its level of 
disclosure based on certain 
characteristics of the strategy of 
governance adopted by the latter. Add 
that we were able to identify several 
groups reflecting a difference in the 
structures of governance but whose 
objective is the same: improving the 
disclosure quality. These results show 
that the characteristics of corporate 
governance to achieve the high quality 
of disclosure are not unique for all 
businesses. Indeed, although there are 
governance standards that should be 
adopted by firms, they may not be 
respected all at once. In other words, a 
company can, for example, have a large 
board of directors (which is not 
recommended by most of the codes of 
best practices), but can have a good 
quality of disclosure. This shows the 
complementarities of governance 
characteristics: Governance is a brand, a 
set of practices that it is impossible to 
ungroup them. Therefore, it is more 
interested to treat these mechanisms 
together and to identify for each firm a 
corporate governance target structure, 
related to a good quality of disclosure. 
These structures are not necessarily all 
good practice recommendations, but 
converge towards the best combination. 
Indeed, in practice, there are companies 
that have a good quality of disclosure 
but that are not well-governed. However, 
we can estimate that by improving their 
system of governance their level of 
disclosure may be best.  
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These results show, in a general 
way, a convergence towards the 
standards of corporate governance with a 
few exceptions that are not such as to 
call in question the corporate governance 
best practices, but to show the specificity 
of Tunisian listed firms and show the 
need for the adoption of a code for each 
context.  
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